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Abstract
Adversarial training (AT) is one of the most effective defenses against adversarial
attacks for deep learning models. In this work, we advocate incorporating the
hypersphere embedding (HE) mechanism into the AT procedure by regularizing
the features onto compact manifolds, which constitutes a lightweight yet effective
module to blend in the strength of representation learning. Our extensive analyses
reveal that AT and HE are well coupled to benefit the robustness of the adversarially
trained models from several aspects. We validate the effectiveness and adaptability
of HE by embedding it into the popular AT frameworks including PGD-AT, ALP,
and TRADES, as well as the FreeAT and FastAT strategies. In the experiments, we
evaluate our methods under a wide range of adversarial attacks on the CIFAR-10
and ImageNet datasets, which verifies that integrating HE can consistently enhance
the model robustness for each AT framework with little extra computation.
1 Introduction
The adversarial vulnerability of deep learning models has been widely recognized in recent years [4,
22, 64]. To mitigate this potential threat, a number of defenses have been proposed, but most of them
are ultimately defeated by the attacks adapted to the specific details of the defenses [2, 8]. Among
the existing defenses, adversarial training (AT) is a general strategy achieving the state-of-the-art
robustness under different settings [57, 67, 76, 79, 80, 82, 90]. Various efforts have been devoted to
improving AT from different aspects, including accelerating the training procedure [60, 61, 75, 85]
and exploiting extra labeled and unlabeled training data [1, 10, 25, 84], which are conducive in the
cases with limited computational resources or additional data accessibility.
In the meanwhile, another research route focuses on boosting the adversarially trained models via
imposing more direct supervision to regularize the learned representations. Along this line, recent
progress shows that encoding triplet-wise metric learning or maximizing the optimal transport (OT)
distance of data batch in AT is effective to leverage the inter-sample interactions, which can promote
the learning of robust classifiers [36, 43, 47, 86]. However, optimization on the sampled triplets or
the OT distance is usually of high computational cost, while the sampling process in metric learning
could also introduce extra class biases on unbalanced data [51, 59].
In this work, we provide a lightweight yet competent module to tackle several defects in the learning
dynamics of existing AT frameworks, and facilitate the adversarially trained networks learning more
robust features. Methodologically, we augment the AT frameworks by integrating the hypersphere
embedding (HE) mechanism, which normalizes the features in the penultimate layer and the weights
in the softmax layer with an additive angular margin. Except for the generic benefits of HE on
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Table 1: Formulations of the AT frameworks without (6) or with (4) HE. The notations are defined
in Sec. 2.2. We substitute the adversarial attacks in ALP with untargeted PGD as suggested [18].
Strategy HE Training objective LT Adversarial objective LA
PGD-AT
6 LCE(f(x∗), y) LCE(f(x′), y)
4 LmCE(f˜(x∗), y) LCE(f˜(x′), y)
ALP
6 αLCE(f(x), y)+(1−α)LCE(f(x∗), y)+λ‖W>(z−z∗)‖2 LCE(f(x′), y)
4 αLmCE(f˜(x), y)+(1−α)LmCE(f˜(x∗), y)+λ‖W˜>(z˜−z˜∗)‖2 LCE(f˜(x′), y)
TRADES
6 LCE(f(x), y) + λLCE(f(x∗), f(x)) LCE(f(x′), f(x))
4 LmCE(f˜(x), y) + λLCE(f˜(x∗), f˜(x)) LCE(f˜(x′), f˜(x))
learning angularly discriminative representations [39, 41, 72, 77], we contribute to the extensive
analyses (detailed in Sec. 3) showing that the encoded HE mechanism naturally adapts to AT in the
sense of (i) resulting in more efficient perturbations when crafting adversarial examples in AT; (ii)
encouraging the model to devote more efforts on learning hard examples, which promote the worst-
case performance under adversarial attacks; (iii) alleviating the unbalanced label distributions caused
by the untargeted or multi-targeted attacks applied in AT [23, 42], where the resulted adversarial
labels depend on the semantic similarity among classes; and (iv) inducing a larger inter-class variance
and margin under the angular metric to further improve model robustness.
Our method is concise and easy to implement. To validate the effectiveness, we consider three typical
AT frameworks to incorporate with HE, namely, PGD-AT [42], ALP [29], and TRADES [87], as
summarized in Table 1. We further verify the generality of our method by evaluating the combination
of HE with previous strategies on accelerating AT, e.g., FreeAT [61] and FastAT [75]. In Sec. 4,
we empirically evaluate the defenses on CIFAR-10 [32] and ImageNet [14] under several different
adversarial attacks, including the commonly adopted PGD [42] and other strong ones like the feature
attack [37], FAB [13], SPSA [69], and NES [27], etc. We also test on the CIFAR-10-C and ImageNet-
C datasets with corrupted images to inspect the robustness under general transformations [24]. The
results demonstrate that incorporating HE can consistently improve the performance of the models
trained by each AT framework, while introducing little extra computation.
2 Methodology
In this section, we define the notations, introduce the hypersphere embedding (HE) mechanism,
and provide the formulations under the adversarial training (AT) frameworks. Due to the limited
space, we extensively introduce the related work in Appendix B, including those on combining metric
learning with AT [36, 43, 46, 48, 86] and further present their bottlenecks.
2.1 Notations
For the classification task with L labels in [L] := {1, · · · , L}, a deep neural network (DNN) can be
generally denoted as the mapping function f(x) for the input x as
f(x) = S(W>z + b), (1)
where z = z(x;ω) is the extracted feature with model parametersω, the matrixW = (W1, · · · ,WL)
and vector b are respectively the weight and bias in the softmax layer, and S(h) : RL → RL is the
softmax function. One common training objective for DNNs is the cross-entropy (CE) loss defined as
LCE(f(x), y) = −1>y log f(x), (2)
where 1y is the one-hot encoding of label y and the logarithm of a vector is taken element-wisely. In
this paper, we use ∠(u, v) to denote the angle between vectors u and v.
2.2 The AT frameworks with HE
Adversarial training (AT) is one of the most effective and widely studied defense strategies against
adversarial vulnerability [6, 35]. Most of the AT methods can be formulated as a two-stage framework:
min
ω,W
E [LT(ω,W|x, x∗, y)] , where x∗ = arg max
x′∈B(x)
LA(x′|x, y,ω,W). (3)
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Here E[·] is the expectation w.r.t. the data distribution, B(x) is a set of allowed points around x, LT
and LA are the training and adversarial objectives, respectively. Since the inner maximization and
outer minimization problems are mutually coupled, they are iteratively executed in training until the
model parameters ω andW converge [42]. To promote the performance of the adversarially trained
models, recent work proposes to embed pair-wise or triplet-wise metric learning into AT [36, 43, 86],
which facilitates the neural networks learning more robust representations. Although these methods
are appealing, they could introduce high computational overhead [43], cause unexpected class
biases [26], or be vulnerable under strong adversarial attacks [37].
In this paper, we address the above deficiencies by presenting a lightweight yet effective module
that integrates the hypersphere embedding (HE) mechanism with an AT procedure. Though HE
is not completely new, our analysis in Sec. 3 demonstrates that HE naturally adapts to the learning
dynamics of AT and can induce several advantages special to the adversarial setting. Specifically,
the HE mechanism involves three typical operations including feature normalization (FN), weight
normalization (WN), and angular margins (AM), as described below.
Note that in Eq. (1) there is W>z = (W>1 z, · · · ,W>L z), and ∀l ∈ [L], the inner product W>l z =
‖Wl‖‖z‖ cos (θl), where θl = ∠(Wl, z).1 Then the WN and FN operations can be denoted as
WN operation: W˜l =
Wl
‖Wl‖ ; FN operation: z˜ =
z
‖z‖ , (4)
Let cosθ = (cos (θ1), · · · , cos (θL)) and W˜ be the weight matrix after executing WN on each
column vector Wl. Then, the output predictions of the DNNs with HE become
f˜(x) = S(W˜>z˜) = S(cosθ), (5)
where no bias vector b exists in f˜(x) [40, 72]. In contrast, the AM operation is only performed in
the training phase, where f˜(x) is fed into the CE loss with a margin m [73], formulated as
LmCE(f˜(x), y) = −1>y log S(s · (cosθ −m · 1y)). (6)
Here s > 0 is a hyperparameter to improve the numerical stability during training [72]. To highlight
our main contributions in terms of methodology, we summarize the proposed formulas of AT in
Table 1. We mainly consider three representative AT frameworks including PGD-AT [42], ALP [29],
and TRADES [87]. The differences between our enhanced versions (with HE) from the original
versions (without HE) are colorized. Note that we apply the HE mechanism both on the adversarial
objective LA for constructing adversarial examples (the inner maximization problem), and the training
objective LT for updating parameters (the outer minimization problem).
3 Analysis of the benefits
In this section, we analyze the benefits induced by the mutual interaction between AT and HE
under the `p-bounded threat model [9], where B(x) = {x′|‖x′ − x‖p ≤ } and  is the maximal
perturbation. Detailed proofs for the conclusions below can be found in Appendix A.
3.1 Formalized first-order adversary
Most of the adversarial attacks applied in AT belong to the family of first-order adversaries [62], due
to the computational efficiency. We first define the vector function Up as
Up(u) = arg max
‖v‖p≤1
u>v, where u>Up(u) = ‖u‖q . (7)
Here ‖ · ‖q is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖p with 1p + 1q = 1 [5]. Specially, there are U2(u) = u‖u‖2 and
U∞(u) = sign(u). If u = ∇x LA, then Up(∇x LA) is the direction of greatest increase of LA under
the first-order Taylor’s expansion [31] and the `p-norm constraint, as stated below:
Lemma 1. (First-order adversary) Given the adversarial objective LA and the setB(x) = {x′|‖x′−
x‖p ≤ }, under the first-order Taylor’s expansion, the solution for maxx′∈B(x) LA(x′) is x∗ =
x+ Up(∇x LA(x)). Furthermore, there is LA(x∗) = LA(x) + ‖∇x LA(x)‖q .
1We omit the subscript of `2-norm without ambiguity.
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According to the one-step formula in Lemma 1, we can generalize to the multi-step generation process
of first-order adversaries under the `p-bounded threat model. For example, in the t-th step of the
iterative attack with step size η [33], the adversarial example x(t) is updated as
x(t) = x(t−1) + ηUp(∇x LA(x(t−1))), (8)
where the increment of the loss is ∆LA = LA(x(t))− LA(x(t−1)) = η‖∇x LA(x(t−1))‖q .
3.2 The inner maximization problem in AT
As shown in Table 1, the adversarial objectives LA are usually the CE loss between the adversarial
prediction f(x′) and the target prediction f(x) or 1y. Thus, to investigate the inner maximization
problem of LA, we expand the gradient of CE loss w.r.t. x′ as below:
Lemma 2. (The gradient of CE loss) LetWij = Wi−Wj be the residual vector between two weights,
and z′ = z(x′;ω) be the mapped feature of the adversarial example x′, then there is
∇x′ LCE(f(x′), f(x)) = −
∑
i 6=j
f(x)if(x
′)j∇x′(W>ij z′). (9)
If f(x) = 1y is the one-hot label vector, we have∇x′ LCE(f(x′), y) = −
∑
l 6=y f(x
′)l∇x′(W>ylz′).
Lemma 2 indicates that the gradient of CE loss can be decomposed into the linear combination
of the gradients on the residual logits W>ij z
′. Let y∗ be the predicted label on the finally crafted
adversarial example x∗, where y∗ 6= y. Based on the empirical observations [21, 45], we are justified
to assume that f(x)y is much larger than f(x)l for l 6= y, and f(x′)y∗ is much larger than f(x′)l for
l 6∈ {y, y∗}. Then we can approximate the linear combination in Eq. (9) with the dominated term as
∇x′ LCE(f(x′), f(x)) ≈ −f(x)yf(x′)y∗∇x′(W>yy∗z′), where Wyy∗ = Wy −Wy∗ . (10)
Let θ′yy∗ = ∠(Wyy∗ , z′), there is W>yy∗z′ = ‖Wyy∗‖‖z′‖ cos(θ′yy∗) and Wyy∗ does not depend on
x′. Thus by substituting Eq. (10) into Eq. (8), the update direction of each attacking step becomes
Up[∇x′ LCE(f(x′), f(x))] ≈ −Up[∇x′(‖z′‖ cos(θ′yy∗))], (11)
where the factor f(x)yf(x′)y∗ is eliminated according to the definition of Up[·]. Note that Eq. (11)
also holds when f(x) = 1y , and the resulted adversarial objective is analogous to the C&W attack [7].
3.3 Benefits from feature normalization
To investigate the effects of FN alone, we deactivate the WN operation in Eq. (5) and denote
f(x) = S(W>z˜). (12)
Then similar to Eq. (11), we can obtain the update direction of the attack with FN applied as
Up[∇x′ LCE(f(x′), f(x))] ≈ −Up[∇x′(cos(θ′yy∗))]. (13)
More effective adversarial perturbations. In the AT procedure, we prefer to craft adversarial
examples more efficiently to reduce the computational burden [38, 71, 75]. As shown in Fig. 1, to
successfully fool the model to classify x′ into the label y∗, the adversary needs to craft iterative
perturbations to move x′ across the decision boundary defined by cos(θ′yy∗) = 0. Under the first-order
optimization, the most effective direction to reach the decision boundary is along −∇x′(cos(θ′yy∗)),
namely, the direction with the steepest descent of cos(θ′yy∗). In contrast, the direction of−∇x′‖z′‖ is
nearly tangent to the contours of cos(θ′yy∗), especially in high-dimension spaces, which is noneffective
as the adversarial perturbation. Actually from Eq. (1) we can observe that when there is no bias term
in the softmax layer, changing the norm ‖z′‖ will not affect the predicted labels at all.
By comparing Eq. (11) and Eq. (13), we can find that applying FN in the adversarial objective
LA exactly removes the noneffective component caused by ‖z′‖, and encourages the adversarial
perturbations to be aligned with the effective direction−∇x′(cos(θ′yy∗)) under the `p-norm constraint.
This facilitate crafting adversarial examples with fewer iterations and improve the efficiency of the
AT progress, as empirically verified in the left panel of Fig. 2. Besides, in Fig. 1 we also provide
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Figure 1: Intuitive illustration in the input space. When applying FN in LA, the adversary can take
more effective update steps to move x′ across the decision boundary defined by cos(θ′yy∗) = 0.
three instantiations of the `p-norm constraint. We can see that if we do not use FN, the impact of the
noneffective component of −∇x′‖z′‖ could be magnified under, e.g., the `∞-norm constraint, which
could consequently require more iterative steps and degrade the training efficiency.
Better learning on hard (adversarial) examples. As to the benefits of applying FN in the training
objective LT, we formally show that FN can promote learning on hard examples, as empirically
observed in the previous work [54]. In the adversarial setting, this property can promote the worst-
case performance under potential adversarial threats. Specifically, the model parameters ω is updated
towards −∇ω LCE. When FN is not applied, we can use similar derivations as in Lemma 2 to obtain
−∇ω LCE(f(x), y) =
∑
l 6=y
f(x)l‖Wyl‖(cos(θyl)∇ω‖z‖+‖z‖∇ω cos(θyl)), (14)
where Wyl = Wy −Wl and θyl = ∠(Wyl, z). According to Eq. (14), when we use a mini-batch
of data to update ω, the inputs with small∇ω‖z‖ or∇ω cos(θyl) contribute less in the direction of
model updating, which are qualitatively regarded as hard examples [54]. This causes the training
process to devote noneffective efforts to increasing ‖z‖ for easy examples and consequently overlook
the hard ones, which leads to vicious circles and could degrade the model robustness against strong
adversarial attacks [55, 63]. As shown in Fig. 3, the hard examples in AT are usually the crafted
adversarial examples, which are those we actually expect the model to focus on in the AT procedure.
In comparison, when FN is applied, there is∇ω‖z˜‖ = 0, then ω is updated towards
−∇ω LCE(f(x), y) =
∑
l 6=y
f(x)l‖Wyl‖∇ω cos(θyl). (15)
In this case, due to the bounded value range [−1, 1] of cosine function, the easy examples will con-
tribute less when they are well learned, i.e., have large cos(θyl), while the hard examples could later
dominate the training. This causes a dynamic training procedure similar to curriculum learning [3].
3.4 Benefits from weight normalization
In the AT procedure, we usually apply untargeted attacks [18, 42]. Since we do not explicit assign
targets, the resulted prediction labels and feature locations of the crafted adversarial examples will
depend on the unbalanced semantic similarity among different classes. For example, the learned
features of dogs and cats are usually closer than those between dogs and planes, so an untargeted
adversary will prefer to fool the model to predict the cat label on a dog image, rather than the plane
label [44]. To understand how the adversarial class biases affect training, assuming that we perform
the gradient descent on a data batch D = {(xk, yk)}k∈[N ]. Then we can derive that ∀l ∈ [L], the
softmax weight Wl is updated towards
−∇Wl LCE(D) =
∑
xk∈Dl
zk −
∑
xk∈D
f(xk)l · zk, (16)
where Dl is the subset of D with true label l. We can see that the weight Wl will tend to have larger
norm when there are more data or easy examples in class l, i.e., larger |Dl| or ‖zk‖ for xk ∈ Dl.
Besides, if an input x in the batch is adversarial, then f(x)y is usually small and consequently z will
have a large effect on the update of Wy . Since there is W>yy∗z < 0, Wy will be updated towards Wy∗
both in norm and direction, which causes repetitive oscillation during training.
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Table 2: Classification accuracy (%) on CIFAR-10 under the white-box threat model. The perturbation
 = 0.031, step size η = 0.003. We highlight the best-performance model under each attack.
Defense Clean PGD-20 PGD-500 MIM-20 FGSM DeepFool C&W FeaAtt. FAB
PGD-AT 86.75 53.97 51.63 55.08 59.70 57.26 84.00 52.38 51.23
PGD-AT + HE 86.19 59.36 57.59 60.19 63.77 61.56 84.07 52.88 54.45
ALP 87.18 52.29 50.13 53.35 58.99 59.40 84.96 49.55 50.54
ALP + HE 89.91 57.69 51.78 58.63 65.08 65.19 87.86 48.64 51.86
TRADES 84.62 56.48 54.84 57.14 61.02 60.70 81.13 55.09 53.58
TRADES + HE 84.88 62.02 60.75 62.71 65.69 60.48 81.44 58.13 53.50
Table 3: Validation of combining FastAT and
FreeAT with HE and m-HE on CIFAR-10. We
report the accuracy (%) on clean and PGD, as
well as the total training time (min).
Defense Epo. Clean PGD-50 Time
FastAT 30 83.80 46.40 11.38
FastAT+HE 30 82.58 52.55 11.48
FastAT+m-HE 30 83.14 53.49 11.49
FreeAT 10 77.21 46.14 15.78
FreeAT+HE 10 76.85 50.98 15.87
FreeAT+m-HE 10 77.59 51.85 15.91
Table 4: Top-1 classification accuracy (%) on
ImageNet under the white-box threat model.
Model Method Clean PGD-10 PGD-50
ResNet-50 FreeAT 60.28 32.13 31.39FreeAT+HE 61.83 40.22 39.85
ResNet-152 FreeAT 65.20 36.97 35.87FreeAT+HE 65.41 43.24 42.60
WRN-50-2 FreeAT 64.18 36.24 35.38FreeAT+HE 65.28 43.83 43.47
WRN-101-2 FreeAT 66.15 39.35 38.23FreeAT+HE 66.37 45.35 45.04
When applying WN, the update of Wl will only depend on the averaged feature direction within each
class, which alleviates the noneffective oscillation on the weight norm and speed up training [56].
Besides, when FN and WN are both applied, the inner products W>z in the softmax layer will
become the angular metric cosθ, as shown in Eq. (5). Then we can naturally introduce AM to learn
angularly more discriminative and robust features [17, 81].
3.5 Modifications to better utilize strong adversaries
In most of the AT procedures, the crafted adversarial examples will only be used once in a single
training step to update the model parameters [42], which means hard adversarial examples may not
have an chance to gradually dominate the training as introduced in Eq. (15). Since∇ω cos(θyy∗) =
− sin(θyy∗)∇ωθyy∗ , the weak adversarial examples around the decision boundary with θyy∗ ∼ 90◦
have higher weights sin(θyy∗). This makes the model tend to overlook the strong adversarial examples
with large θyy∗ , which contain abundant information. To be better compatible with strong adversaries,
an easy-to-implement way is to directly substitute S(cosθ) in Eq. (5) with S(−θ), using the arccos
operator. We name this form of embedding as modified HE (m-HE), as evaluated in Table 3.
4 Experiments
CIFAR-10 [32] setup. We apply the wide residual network WRN-34-10 as the model architec-
ture [83]. For each AT framework, we set the maximal perturbation  = 8/255, the perturbation step
size η = 2/255, and the number of iterations K = 10. We apply the momentum SGD [53] optimizer
with the initial learning rate of 0.1, and train for 100 epochs. The learning rate decays with a factor of
0.1 at 75 and 90 epochs, respectively. The mini-batch size is 128. Besides, we set the regularization
parameter 1/λ as 6 for TRADES, and set the adversarial logit pairing weight as 0.5 for ALP [29, 87].
The scale s = 15 and the margin m = 0.2 in HE, where different s and m correspond to different
trade-offs between the accuracy and robustness, as detailed in Appendix C.3.
ImageNet [14] setup. We apply the framework of free adversarial training (FreeAT) in Shafahi et al.
[61], which has a similar training objective as PGD-AT and can train a robust model using four GPU
workers. We set the repeat times m = 4 in FreeAT. The perturbation  = 4/255 with the step size
η = 1/255. We train the model for 90 epochs with the initial learning rate of 0.1, and the mini-batch
size is 256. The scale s = 10 and the margin m = 0.2 in HE.2
4.1 Performance under white-box attacks
On the CIFAR-10 dataset, we test the defenses under different attacks including FGSM [22], PGD [42],
MIM [15], Deepfool [44], C&W (l∞ version) [7], feature attack [37], and FAB [13]. We report the
classification accuracy in Table 2 following the evaluation settings in Zhang et al. [87]. We denote the
2Code is available at https://github.com/ShawnXYang/AT_HE.
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Table 5: Top-1 classification accuracy (%) on CIFAR-10-C and ImageNet-C. The models are
trained on the original datasets CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, respectively. Here ’mCA’ refers to the mean
accuracy averaged on different corruptions and severity. Full version of the table is in Appendix C.6.
Defense mCA Blur Weather DigitalDefocus Glass Motion Zoom Snow Frost Fog Bright Contra Elastic Pixel JPEG
CIFAR-10-C
PGD-AT 77.23 81.84 79.69 77.62 80.88 81.32 77.95 61.70 84.05 44.55 80.79 84.76 84.35
PGD-AT+HE 77.29 81.86 79.45 78.17 80.87 80.77 77.98 62.45 83.67 45.11 80.69 84.16 84.10
ALP 77.73 81.94 80.31 78.23 80.97 81.74 79.26 61.51 84.88 45.86 80.91 85.09 84.68
ALP+HE 80.55 80.87 85.23 81.26 84.43 85.14 83.89 68.83 88.33 50.74 84.44 87.44 87.28
TRADES 75.36 79.84 77.72 76.34 78.66 79.52 76.94 59.68 82.06 43.80 78.53 82.65 82.31
TRADES+HE 75.78 80.55 77.61 77.26 79.62 79.23 76.53 61.39 82.33 45.04 79.29 82.50 82.40
ImageNet-C
FreeAT 28.22 19.15 26.63 25.75 28.25 23.03 23.47 3.71 45.18 5.40 41.76 48.78 52.55
FreeAT+HE 30.04 21.16 29.28 28.08 30.76 26.62 28.35 5.34 49.88 7.03 44.72 51.17 55.05
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Figure 2: Left. Accuracy (%) under PGD-20, where the models are trained by PGD-AT with different
iteration steps on CIFAR-10. Right. Visualization of the adversarial perturbations on ImageNet.
iteration steps behind the attacking method, e.g., 10-step PGD as PGD-10. To verify that our strategy
is generally compatible with previous work on accelerating AT, we combine HE with the one-step
based FreeAT and fast adversarial training (FastAT) frameworks [75]. We provide the accuracy and
training time results in Table 3. We can see that the operations in HE increase negligible computation,
even in the cases pursuing extremely fast training. Besides, we also evaluate embedding m-HE
(introduced in Sec. 3.5) and find it more effective than HE when combining with PGD-AT, FreeAT
and Fast AT that exclusively train on adversarial examples. On the ImageNet dataset, we follow the
evaluation settings in Shafahi et al. [61] to test under PGD-10 and PGD-50, as shown in Table 4.
Ablation studies. To investigate the individual effects caused by the three components FN, WN,
and AM in HE, we perform the ablation studies for PGD-AT on CIFAR-10, and attack the trained
models with PGD-20. We get the clean and robust accuracy of 86.43% / 54.46% for PGD-AT+FN,
and 87.28% / 53.93% for PGD-AT+WN. In contrast, when we apply both the FN and WN, we can
get the result of 86.20% / 58.95%. For TRADES, applying appropriate AM can increase ∼2% robust
accuracy compared to only applying FN and WN. Detailed results are included in the Appendix C.3.
Adaptive attacks. A generic PGD attack apply the cross-entropy loss on the model prediction as the
adversarial objective, as reported in Table 2. To exclude the potential effect of gradient obfuscation [2],
we construct an adaptive version of the PGD attack against our methods, which uses the training loss
in Eq. (6) with the scalar s and margin m as the adversarial objective. In this case, when we apply the
adaptive PGD-20 / PGD-500 attack, we will get a accuracy of 55.25% / 52.54% for PGD-AT+HE,
which is still higher than the accuracy of 53.97% / 51.63% for PGD-AT (quote from Table 2).
4.2 Performance under black-box attacks
Query-based Black-box Attacks. ZOO [11] proposes to estimate the gradient at each coordinate ei
as gˆi, with a small finite-difference σ. In experiments, we randomly select one sampled coordinate to
perform one update with gˆi, and adopt the C&W optimization mechanism based on the estimated
gradient. We set σ as 10−4 and max queries as 20, 000. SPSA [69] and NES [27] can make a full
gradient evaluation by drawing random samples and obtaining the corresponding loss values. NES
randomly samples from a Gaussian distribution to acquire the direction vectors while SPSA samples
from a Rademacher distribution. In experiments, we set the number of random samples q as 128
for every iteration and σ = 0.001. We show the robustness of different iterations against untargeted
score-based ZOO, SPSA, and NES in Table 6, where details on these attacks are in Appendix B.2.
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Table 6: Classification accuracy (%) under different black-box query-based attacks on CIFAR-10.
Method Iterations PGD-AT PGD-AT + HE ALP ALP + HE TRADES TRADES + HE
ZOO - 73.47 74.65 72.70 74.90 71.92 74.65
SPSA
20 73.64 73.66 73.11 74.45 72.12 72.36
50 68.93 69.31 68.39 68.28 68.20 68.42
80 65.67 65.97 65.14 63.89 65.32 65.62
NES
20 74.68 74.87 74.41 75.91 73.40 73.47
50 71.22 71.48 70.81 71.11 70.29 70.53
80 69.16 69.92 68.88 68.53 68.83 69.06
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Figure 3: The ratios of E(‖∇ω L(x∗)‖/‖∇ω L(x)‖) w.r.t. different parameters ω, where x∗ and x
are the adversarial example and its clean counterpart. Higher ratio values indicate more attention on
the adversarial examples. ’B’ refers to block, ’L’ refers to layer, ’conv’ refers to convolution.
We include detailed experiments on the transfer-based black-box attacks in Appendix C.4. As
expected, these results show that embedding HE can generally provide promotion under the black-box
threat models [9], including the transfer-based and the query-based black-box attacks.
4.3 Performance under general-purpose attacks
It has been shown that the adversarially trained models could be vulnerable to rotations [19], image
corruptions [20] or affine attacks [66]. Therefore, we evaluate on the benchmarks with distributional
shifts: CIFAR-10-C and ImageNet-C [24]. As shown in Table 5, we report the classification accuracy
under each corruption averaged on five levels of severity, where the models are WRN-34-10 trained on
CIFAR-10 and ResNet-50 trained on ImageNet, respectively. Here we adopt accuracy as the metric to
be consistent with other results, while the reported values can easily convert into the corruption error
metric [24]. We can find that our methods lead to better robustness under a wide range of corruptions
that are not seen in training, which prevents the models from overfitting to certain attacking patterns.
4.4 More empirical analyses
As shown in the left panel of Fig. 2, we separately use PGD-1 to PGD-7 to generate adversarial
examples in training, then we evaluate the trained models under the PGD-20 attack. Our method
requires fewer iterations of PGD to achieve certain robust accuracy, e.g., applying 3-step PGD
in PGD-AT+HE is more robust than applying 7-step PGD in PGD-AT, which largely reduces the
necessary computation [74]. Besides, previous studies observe that the adversarial examples against
robust models exhibit salient data characteristics [28, 58, 65, 68, 89]. So we visualize the untargeted
perturbations on ImageNet, as shown in the right panel of Fig. 2. We can observe that the adversarial
perturbations produced for our method have sharper profiles and more concrete details, which are
better aligned with human perception. Finally in Fig. 3, we calculate the norm ratios of the loss
gradient on the adversarial example to it on the clean example. The model is trained for 70 epochs on
CIFAR-10 using PGD-AT. The results verify that our method can prompt the training procedure to
assign larger gradients on the crafted adversarial examples, which would benefit robust learning.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose to embed the HE mechanism into AT, in order to enhance the robustness of
the adversarially trained models. We analyze the intriguing benefits induced by the interaction between
AT and HE from several aspects. It is worth clarifying that empirically our HE module has varying
degrees of adaptability on combining different AT frameworks, depending on the specific training
principles. Still, incorporating the HE mechanism is generally conducive to robust learning and
compatible with previous strategies, with little extra computation and simple code implementation.
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Broader Impact
When deploying machine learning methods into the practical systems, the adversarial vulnerability
can cause a potential security risk, as well as the negative impact on the crisis of confidence by the
public. To this end, this inherent defect raises the requirements for reliable, general, and lightweight
strategies to enhance the model robustness against malicious, especially adversarial attacks. In this
work, we provide a simple and efficient way to boost the robustness of the adversarially trained
models, which contributes to the modules of constructing more reliable systems in different tasks.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Given a loss function L and under the first-order Taylor expansion, the solution of
max
‖x′−x‖p≤
L(x′)
is x∗ = x+ Up(∇L(x)). Furthermore, there is L(x∗) = L(x) + ‖∇L(x)‖q, where ‖ · ‖q is the
dual norm of ‖ · ‖p.
Proof. We denote x′ = x + v, where ‖v‖p ≤ 1. Then we know that ‖x′ − x‖p ≤ . Under the
first-order Taylor expansion, there is
max
‖x′−x‖p≤
L(x′) = max
‖v‖p≤1
[L(x) + v>∇L(x)]
= L(x) +  max
‖v‖p≤1
v>∇L(x).
According to the definition of the dual norm [5], there is max‖v‖p≤1 v
>∇L(x) = ‖∇L(x)‖q , where
where ‖ · ‖q is the dual norm of ‖ · ‖p. Thus we prove that L(x∗) = L(x) + ‖∇L(x)‖q and
x∗ = x+ Up(∇L(x)).
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 2. By derivations, there is
∇x′ LCE(f(x′), f(x)) = −
∑
i 6=j
f(x)if(x
′)j∇x′(W>ij z′),
where Wij = Wi − Wj , z′ = z(x′;ω). When f(x) = 1y, we have ∇x′ LCE(f(x′), y) =
−∑l 6=y f(x′)l∇x′(W>ylz′).
Proof. By derivations, there is
−∇x′ LCE(f(x′), f(x))
= ∇x′
(
f(x)> log f(x′)
)
=
∑
i∈[L]
f(x)i∇x′ log(f(x′)i)
=
∑
i∈[L]
f(x)i∇x′ log
(
exp(W>i z
′)∑
j∈[L] exp(W
>
j z
′)
)
=
∑
i∈[L]
f(x)i∇x′
W>i z′ − log
∑
j∈[L]
exp(W>j z
′)

=
∑
i∈[L]
f(x)i
∇x′(W>i z′)− ∑
j∈[L]
f(x′)j∇x′(W>j z′)

=
∑
i∈[L]
f(x)i
∑
j 6=i
f(x′)j∇x′(W>ij z′)

=
∑
i 6=j
f(x)if(x
′)j∇x′(W>ij z′).
Specially, when f(x) = 1y , we can obtain based on the above formulas that
∇x′ LCE(f(x′), y) = −
∑
l 6=y
f(x′)l∇x′(W>ylz′).
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B Related work
In this section, we extensively introduce the related work in the adversarial setting, including the
adversarial threat models (Sec. B.1), the adversarial attacks (Sec. B.2), the adversarial training strategy
(Sec. B.3), and some recent work on combining metric learning with adversarial training (Sec. B.4).
B.1 Adversarial threat models
Now we introduce different threat models in the adversarial setting following the suggestions in
Carlini et al. [9]. Specifically, a threat model includes a set of assumptions about the adversary’s
goals, capabilities, and knowledge.
Adversary’s goals could be simply fooling the classifiers to misclassify, which is referred to as
untargeted mode. On the other hand, the goals can be more aggressive to make the model misclassify
from a source class into a target class, which is referred to as targeted mode.
Adversary’s capabilities describe the constraints imposed on the attackers. For the `p bounded threat
models, adversarial examples require the perturbation δ to be bounded by a preset threshold  under
`p-norm, i.e., ‖δ‖p ≤ .
Adversary’s knowledge tells what knowledge the adversary is assumed to own. Typically, there are
four settings when evaluating a defense method:
• Oblivious adversaries are not aware of the existence of the defense D and generate adver-
sarial examples based on the unsecured classification model F [8].
• White-box adversaries know the scheme and parameters of D, and can design adaptive
methods to attack both the model F and the defense D simultaneously [2].
• Black-box adversaries have no access to the parameters of the defense D or the model F
with varying degrees of black-box access [15].
• General-purpose adversaries apply general transformations or corruptions on the images,
which are related to traditional research topics on the input invariances [25, 88].
B.2 Adversarial attacks
Below we show the details of the attack methods that we test on in our experiments. For clarity, we
only introduce the untargeted attacks. The descriptions below mainly adopt from Dong et al. [16].
FGSM [22] generates an untargeted adversarial example under the `∞ norm as
xadv = x+  · sign(∇xLCE(x, y)). (17)
BIM [33] extends FGSM by iteratively taking multiple small gradient updates as
xadvt+1 = clipx,
(
xadvt + η · sign(∇xLCE(xadvt , y))
)
, (18)
where clipx, projects the adversarial example to satisfy the `∞ constrain and η is the step size.
PGD [42] is similar to BIM except that the initial point xadv0 is uniformly sampled from the neigh-
borhood around the clean input x, which can cover wider diversity of the adversarial space [75].
MIM [15] integrates a momentum term into BIM with the decay factor µ = 1.0 as
gt+1 = µ · gt + ∇xLCE(x
adv
t , y)
‖∇xLCE(xadvt , y)‖1
, (19)
where the adversarial examples are updated by
xadvt+1 = clipx,(x
adv
t + α · sign(gt+1)). (20)
MIM has good performance as a transfer-based attack, which won the NeurIPS 2017 Adversarial
Competition [35]. We set the step size η and the number of iterations identical to those in BIM.
DeepFool [44] is also an iterative attack method, which generates an adversarial example on the
decision boundary of a classifier with the minimum perturbation. We set the maximum number of
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iterations as 100 in DeepFool, and it will early stop when the solution at an intermediate iteration is
already adversarial.
C&W [7] is a powerful optimization-based attack method, which generates an `2 adversarial example
xadv by solving
arg min
x′
{
c ·max(Z(x′)y −max
i 6=y
Z(x′)i, 0)
+ ‖x′ − x‖22
}
,
(21)
where Z(x′) is the logit output of the classifier and c is a constant. This optimization problem is
solved by an Adam [30] optimizer. c is found by binary search. The C&W attack can also be applied
under the `∞ threat model with the adversarial loss function max(Z(x′)y − maxi6=y Z(x′)i, 0),
using the iterative crafting process.
ZOO [11] has been proposed to optimize Eq. (21) in the black-box manner through queries. It
estimates the gradient at each coordinate as
gˆi =
L(x+ σei, y)− L(x− σei, y)
2σ
≈ ∂L(x, y)
∂xi
, (22)
where L is the objective in Eq. (21), σ is a small constant, and ei is the i-th unit basis vector. In our
experiments, we perform one update with gˆi at one randomly sampled coordinate. We set σ = 10−4
and max queries as 20, 000.
NES [27] and SPSA [69] adopt the update rule in Eq. (18) for adversarial example generation.
Although the true gradient is unavailable, NES and SPSA give the full gradient estimation as
gˆ =
1
q
q∑
i=1
J (x+ σui, y)− J (x− σui, y)
2σ
· ui, (23)
where we use J (x, y) = Z(x)y −maxi 6=y Z(x)i instead of the cross-entropy loss, {ui}qi=1 are the
random vectors sampled from a Gaussian distribution in NES, and a Rademacher distribution in
SPSA. We set σ = 0.001 and q = 128 in our experiments, as default in the original papers.
B.3 Adversarial training
Adversarial training (AT) is one of the most effective strategies on defending adversarial attacks,
which dominates the winner solutions in recent adversarial defense competitions [6, 35]. The AT
strategy stems from the seminal work of Goodfellow et al. [22], where the authors propose to craft
adversarial examples with FGSM and augment them into the training data batch in a mixed manner,
i.e., each mini-batch of training data consists of a mixture of clean and crafted adversarial samples.
However, FGSM-based AT was shown to be vulnerable under multi-step attacks, where Wong et al.
[75] later verify that random initialization is critical for the success of FGSM-based AT. Recent work
also tries to solve the degeneration problem of one-step AT by adding regularizers [70]. Another
well-known AT strategy using the mixed mini-batch manner is ALP [29], which regularizes the
distance between the clean logits and the adversarial ones. But later Engstrom et al. [18] successfully
evade the models trained by ALP. As to the mixed mini-batch AT, Xie and Yuille [78] show that
using an auxiliary batch normalization for the adversarial part in the data batch can improve the
performance of the trained models.
Among the proposed AT frameworks, the most popular one is the PGD-AT [42], which formulates
the adversarial training procedure as a min-max problem. Zhang et al. [87] propose the TRADES
framework to further enhance the model robustness by an additional regularizer between model
predictions, which achieves state-of-the-art performance in the adversarial competition of NeurIPS
2018 [6]. However, multi-step AT usually causes high computation burden, where training a robust
model on ImageNet requires tens of GPU workers in parallel [34, 79]. To reduce the computational
cost, Shafahi et al. [61] propose the FreeAT strategy to reuse the back-propagation result for crafting
the next adversarial perturbation, which facilitate training robust models on ImageNet with four
GPUs running for two days.
B.4 Metric learning + adversarial training
Previous work finds that the adversarial attack would cause the internal representation to shift closer
to the "false" class [43, 36]. Based on this observation, they propose to introduce an extra triplet loss
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term in the training objective to capture the stable metric space representation, formulated as
Ltrip(z(x∗), z(xp), z(xn))
= [D(z(x∗), z(xp))−D(z(x∗), z(xn)) + α]+ ,
(24)
where α > 0 is a hyperparameter for margin, x∗ (anchor example) is an adversarial counterpart based
on the clean input x, xp (positive example) is a clean image from the same class of x; xn (negative
example) is a clean image from a different class. Here D(u, v) is a distance function. Mao et al.
[43] employ an angular distance as D(u, v) = 1− cos∠(u, v); Li et al. [36] apply the `∞ distance
as D(u, v) = ‖u − v‖∞. In the implementation, these methods apply some heuristic strategies to
sample triplets, in order to alleviate high computation overhead. For example, Mao et al. [43] select
the closest sample in a mini-batch as an approximation to the semi-hard negative example. However,
the optimization on sampled triplets is still computationally expensive and could introduce class
biases on unbalanced datasets [26].
Zhang and Wang [86] apply a feature-scatter solver for the inner maximization problem of AT, which
is different from PGD. Instead of crafting each adversarial example based on its clean counterpart, the
feature-scatter solver generate the adversarial examples in batch to utilize inter-sample interactions,
via maximizing the optimal transport (OT) distance between the clean and adversarial empirical
distributions. In the implementation, they use practical OT-solvers to calculate the OT distance and
maximize it w.r.t. the adversarial examples. However, the calculation of the OT distance will increase
the computational burden for the AT procedure. Besides, the feature-scatter solver also leads to
potential threats for the trained models to be evaded by adaptive attacks, e.g., feature attacks, as
discussed before34.
C More empirical results
In this section, we provide more empirical results and setups. In our experiments, we apply NVIDIA
P100 / 2080Ti GPUs, as well as the Apex package to execute training for FastAT [12, 75]. On
CIFAR-10, all the models are trained by four GPUs in parallel for PGD-AT, ALP, and TRADES.
C.1 Code references
To ensure that our experiments perform fair comparison with previous work, we largely adopt the
public codes and make minimal modifications on them to run the trials. Specifically, we refer to the
codes of TRADES5 [87], FreeAT6 [61], FastAT7 [75] and the corrupted datasets8 from Hendrycks
and Dietterich [24]. The codes are mostly based on PyTorch [52].
C.2 Datasets
The CIFAR-10 dataset [32] consists of 60,000 32x32 colour images in 10 classes, with 6,000 images
per class. There are 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images. We perform RandomCrop with 4
padding and RandomHorizontalFlip in training as the data augmentation. The ImageNet (ILSVRC
2012) dataset [14] consists of 1.28 million training images and 50,000 validation images in 1,000
classes. As to the data augmentation, we perform RandomResizedCrop and RandomHorizontalFlip
in training; Resize and CenterCrop in test. The image size is 256 and the crop size is 224.
C.3 Extensive ablation studies
Different choices of the scale s and the margin m in HE lead to different trade-offs between the clean
accuracy and the adversarial robustness of the trained models, as shown in Table 7. This kind of
trade-off is ubiquitous w.r.t. the hyperparameter settings in different AT frameworks [29, 87].
3https://github.com/Line290/FeatureAttack
4https://openreview.net/forum?id=Syejj0NYvr&noteId=rkeBhuBMjS
5https://github.com/yaodongyu/TRADES
6https://github.com/mahyarnajibi/FreeAdversarialTraining
7https://github.com/locuslab/fast_adversarial
8https://github.com/hendrycks/robustness
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Table 7: Classification accuracy (%) on CIFAR-10. The training framework is TRADES + HE with
different scale s and margin m. We report the performance on clean inputs and under PGD-20 attack.
Defense Scale s Margin m Clean PGD-20
TRADES + HE
15 0.0 82.53 60.35
15 0.1 85.00 61.13
15 0.2 84.88 62.02
15 0.3 82.99 61.54
15 0.4 78.05 58.05
15 0.5 74.71 56.27
1 0.2 89.34 50.33
5 0.2 85.70 58.75
10 0.2 85.30 60.17
15 0.2 84.88 62.02
20 0.2 77.67 57.51
C.4 Transfer-based black-box attacks
Due to the adversarial transferability [49, 50], the black-box adversaries can construct adversarial
examples based on the substitute models and then feed these examples to evade the original models.
In our experiments, we apply PGD-AT, ALP, and TRADES to train the substitute models, respectively.
To generate adversarial perturbations, we employ the untargeted PGD-20 [42] and MIM-20 [15]
attacks, where the MIM attack won both the targeted and untargeted attacking tracking in the
adversarial competition of NeurIPS 2017 [35]. In Fig. 4, we show the results of transfer-based attacks
against the defense models trained without or with the HE mechanism. As expected, we can see that
applying HE can also better defend transfer-based attacks.
Figure 4: Classification accuracy (%) under the black-box transfer-based attacks on CIFAR-10. The
substitute models are PGD-AT, ALP and TRADES separately. * indicates white-box cases.
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C.5 Full results of m-HE on CIFAR-10
In Table 8, we evaluate the white-box performance of the combinations of the modified HE (m-HE)
with PGD-AT, ALP, and TRADES. We set the parameters with s = 15 and m = 0.1. We can see that
m-HE is more effective than HE when combining with PGD-AT, FreeAT and Fast AT that exclusively
train on adversarial examples. In contrast, HE performs better than m-HE when combining with the
frameworks training on the mixture of clean and adversarial examples, e.g., ALP and TRADES.
Table 8: Classification accuracy (%) on CIFAR-10 under the white-box threat model. The perturbation
 = 0.031, step size η = 0.003, following the setting in Zhang et al. [87].
Defense Clean PGD-20 PGD-500 MIM-20 FGSM DeepFool C&W-`∞
PGD-AT 86.75 53.97 51.63 55.08 59.70 57.26 84.00
PGD-AT + HE 86.19 59.36 57.59 60.19 63.77 61.56 84.07
PGD-AT + m-HE 86.25 59.90 58.46 60.50 63.70 59.47 83.71
ALP 87.18 52.29 50.13 53.35 58.99 59.40 84.96
ALP + HE 89.91 57.69 51.78 58.63 65.08 65.19 87.86
ALP + m-HE 89.23 57.09 53.34 58.04 63.81 60.74 87.21
TRADES 84.62 56.48 54.84 57.14 61.02 60.70 81.13
TRADES + HE 84.88 62.02 60.75 62.71 65.69 60.48 81.44
TRADES + m-HE 84.30 61.83 60.43 62.67 65.49 60.51 80.53
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C.6 Full results on CIFAR-10-C and ImageNet-C
In Table 9 and Table 10 we provide the full classification accuracy results of different defenses on
CIFAR-10-C and ImageNet-C [24], respectively. These reports include detailed accuracy under 75
combinations of severity and corruption.
Table 9: Classification accuracy (%) on CIFAR-10-C. Full results on different combination of
severity and corruption. Here ’S’ refers to the severity from 1 to 5, ’P’ refers to PGD-AT, ’A’ refers
to ALP, ’T’ refers to TRADES.
Defense S Noise Blur Weather DigitalGauss Shot Impulse Defocus Glass Motion Zoom Snow Frost Fog Bright Contra Elastic Pixel JPEG
P
1 85.97 86.3 83.55 86.15 81.92 83.65 82.86 86.12 84.88 84.27 87.15 82.37 82.06 86.23 85.17
2 84.16 85.82 79.92 84.8 82.06 80.09 82.49 84.4 80.84 76.22 86.68 59.77 82.2 85.62 84.64
3 81.22 83.08 76.79 82.87 81.55 76.32 81.12 82.39 75.24 65.71 85.7 40.64 81.13 85.33 84.41
4 79.4 81.2 69.55 80.67 76.18 76.39 80.17 78.03 75.93 51.96 83.87 23.09 79.65 84.27 83.86
5 77.48 78.02 62.8 74.7 76.72 71.66 77.77 75.69 72.9 30.37 76.86 16.9 78.95 82.37 83.69
P+HE
1 85.37 85.67 83.7 85.63 81.51 83.75 82.67 85.33 84.26 84.1 86.45 82.43 81.69 85.43 85.05
2 83.69 84.99 80.97 84.5 81.76 80.66 82.33 83.99 80.33 76.84 86.0 61.36 81.92 85.15 84.52
3 81.14 82.46 78.01 82.65 81.2 76.73 81.11 81.43 75.71 66.59 85.17 41.76 81.2 84.63 84.05
4 79.74 81.25 71.67 80.83 76.14 77.03 80.09 77.77 76.35 52.75 83.31 23.65 80.01 83.77 83.67
5 77.76 77.99 66.37 75.58 76.67 72.68 78.16 75.35 73.28 31.96 77.44 16.36 78.61 81.84 83.23
A
1 86.57 86.93 84.13 86.53 83.04 84.12 83.07 86.4 85.77 85.12 87.4 83.21 82.18 86.46 85.79
2 84.96 86.31 80.48 85.01 82.65 81.04 82.73 84.86 82.19 77.27 87.24 61.34 82.11 86.02 85.09
3 81.84 83.55 77.23 82.84 81.83 76.91 81.15 82.76 76.57 65.68 86.36 41.96 81.32 85.73 84.63
4 80.05 81.64 69.53 80.65 77.1 77.09 80.17 78.56 77.54 51.09 84.74 24.92 80.13 84.46 84.23
5 78.01 78.6 62.97 74.69 76.96 71.99 77.75 76.13 74.26 28.39 78.66 17.85 78.81 82.79 83.68
A+HE
1 88.61 89.27 85.56 89.58 83.58 87.05 86.36 88.71 88.62 88.2 90.1 86.55 85.93 89.37 88.52
2 85.89 88.25 81.13 88.15 83.79 83.83 85.88 87.0 86.2 82.37 89.9 69.33 85.97 88.72 87.62
3 81.61 83.99 76.29 86.14 83.69 79.81 84.68 85.71 82.47 73.58 89.13 51.2 84.94 87.98 86.99
4 78.72 81.42 67.61 84.08 75.73 80.34 83.73 82.52 82.79 61.5 88.06 30.06 83.36 86.92 86.89
5 76.26 76.64 60.84 78.21 77.56 75.28 81.5 81.76 79.36 38.48 84.46 16.58 82.01 84.19 86.37
T
1 83.74 84.16 81.61 84.01 79.97 81.98 80.69 84.16 83.57 82.53 85.21 79.91 79.47 84.22 83.27
2 81.84 83.44 78.34 82.61 79.85 78.62 80.04 82.96 79.7 74.42 84.78 57.63 79.8 83.45 82.64
3 78.63 80.56 74.84 80.58 79.55 75.09 78.9 80.79 73.97 63.06 83.78 39.34 79.05 83.07 82.32
4 77.09 78.42 67.85 78.62 74.7 75.0 77.9 76.33 75.08 49.91 82.13 24.6 77.48 82.2 81.83
5 74.8 75.27 61.88 73.4 74.55 71.03 75.78 73.39 72.41 28.5 74.41 17.54 76.86 80.31 81.53
T+HE
1 83.06 83.78 81.12 83.96 79.42 82.13 81.28 83.69 83.22 82.31 85.0 80.2 80.35 83.84 83.24
2 81.18 83.02 78.41 82.89 79.75 79.39 81.03 82.23 79.21 75.12 84.93 60.38 80.14 83.23 82.64
3 78.43 80.11 75.4 81.35 79.53 76.19 79.9 80.13 73.93 65.6 83.87 41.97 79.88 83.12 82.37
4 76.85 78.63 69.59 79.78 74.03 76.62 78.95 76.34 74.51 52.36 82.2 25.59 78.33 82.16 82.07
5 74.89 75.55 64.55 74.77 75.32 71.98 76.92 73.74 71.79 31.56 75.64 17.07 77.74 80.17 81.66
Table 10: Classification accuracy (%) on ImageNet-C. Full results on different combination of
severity and corruption. Here ’S’ refers to the severity from 1 to 5, ’F’ refers to FreeAT.
Defense S Noise Blur Weather DigitalGauss Shot Impulse Defocus Glass Motion Zoom Snow Frost Fog Bright Contra Elastic Pixel JPEG
F
1 54.26 53.23 44.00 33.91 42.25 43.97 38.64 42.57 45.83 11.00 56.42 18.29 48.45 53.91 54.74
2 45.84 43.08 32.60 26.68 34.06 34.70 33.36 26.16 28.50 4.41 53.20 6.59 31.78 52.98 53.92
3 29.74 28.36 23.48 16.82 25.22 23.83 26.93 22.69 17.22 1.54 47.98 1.38 49.64 50.19 53.34
4 12.96 10.66 8.91 11.10 19.35 15.20 23.52 11.98 15.51 1.20 39.56 0.40 46.09 45.24 51.57
5 3.28 4.85 2.73 7.25 12.29 11.05 18.84 11.75 10.28 0.43 28.73 0.34 32.82 41.55 49.19
F+HE
1 55.14 53.27 44.29 38.15 46.08 47.57 41.90 45.92 50.32 15.25 58.73 23.31 51.15 56.17 57.03
2 43.96 40.02 29.08 30.34 37.97 38.39 36.21 30.21 34.26 6.59 56.47 9.23 34.61 55.40 56.23
3 24.49 23.14 18.38 18.52 27.98 26.44 29.38 26.83 22.34 2.39 52.39 1.71 52.64 52.65 55.77
4 9.37 8.37 5.89 11.71 21.45 16.42 25.61 15.22 20.43 1.85 45.56 0.47 48.94 47.82 54.17
5 2.23 3.95 1.63 7.09 12.93 11.59 20.68 14.89 14.36 0.58 36.21 0.41 36.25 43.81 52.04
20
